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Abstract
. An economy with individuals who produce output with lalx>r is subjected to a one-
time change in the aggregate money stock, the magnitude and expected waiting time of which
are known. Individuals cannot observe the aggregate quantity of money however, and must
therefore infer the time of occurrence of the shock from observations of market-specific prices.
Because their information is incomplete, t hey erroneously respond to aggregate nominal changes
as if they were market-specific real changes. An aggregate real response ensues as predicted by
Phelps (1969) and as previously modelled by Lucas (1972).
In contrast to Lucas's approach, 1 use a transactions-oriental model of money. Money
growth is effected neither through proportional transfers nor through lump sum transfers. There
is an intertemporal substitution effect induced by the money growth mechanism, When this
effect is netted out of the equilibrium, there is residual fluctuation that can be ascribed to
imperfect information.
1. INTRODUCTION
The giant axon of the squid is much larger than ordinary nerve cells. Its size enables
physiologists to isolate it from the squid, immerse it in a saline solution, and insert voltage
probes into it. When shocked at one end, an electrochemical impulse-, the so-called action
potential, propogates along the axon. Its speed of proposition, the pattern of voltages
as it passes the probes, and the ion exchanges that propoxate the impulse and recover
in preparation for new impulses can be monitored. Such laboratory experiments capture
only the axon's impulse process, not its interaction with other nerves and with the muscles
of the living squid. But it is the very fact that it can be studied in isolation from the
distractions of the squid's body that makes understanding possible.
What follows is a study of an abstract economy's action potential, isolated from dis-
tracting influences. The shock is a sudden change in the supply of money. The action
potential is the economy's response to the shock with real output. Isolating the- shock
reveals two mechanisms that respond to the shock: an intertemporal substition effect and
a signal extraction effect. The signal extraction effect is the same effect found by Robert
E. Lucas. Jr. in his 1972 article. ""Expectations and the Neutrality of Money". Replicating
the effect in a single shock model makes possible the separate analysis of the intertemporal
substitution effect and signal extraction effects. They are synergistic.
Recall the Phelps (1969) island paradigm that Lucas used to motivate the signal
extraction effect:
I have found it instructive- to picture the economy as a group of islands between
which information flows arc- costly: To learn the wage- paid on an adjacent island.
the worker must spend the day travelling to that island to sample its wage instead
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of spending rlie day at work. [ ...] Producers on each island are in pure com-
petition in the labor market as well as in the interisland product markets. Each
morning, on each island, workers "shape up'" for an auction that the determines
the market -clearing money wage and employment level.
[. . .] Now let aggregate demand fall. If the decline of derived demand for labor
were understood to be general and uniform across islands, money wage rates
(and with them prices) would fall so as to maintain employment and the real
wage rate. [. . . ] But suppose workers on every island believe the fall of demand
is at least partially island-specific, owing to their island's individual product mix.
It is natural then to postulate, with Alchian, that workers' expectations of money
wage rates elsewhere (on other islands) will '"adapt" less than proportionally to
the unforseen fall of money wage rates. ...Effective labor supply thus shifts
leftward at every real wage rate: real wages rise, and profit maximizing output
and employment fall. [Phelps. l!)(ii). pp. 6-7.]
Lucas's paper incorporates several features in order to model this paradigm when the
decline in aggregate demand is due to a monetary contraction: it is fully market clearing, it
is dynamic, individuals have imperfect asymmetric information about the economy's state
with prices as their information source, and it incorporates money demand explicitly.
The model I present here is an attempt to imitate the Lucas-Phelps program—
a
dynamic general equilibrium asymmetric information model of monetary shocks -using
a transactions-based demand for money. Such models arc difficult to solve because each
individual's state variables must be accounted for in the ongoing equilibrium, and the
state variables include potentially complicated and heterogeneous information vectors. An
equilibrium is a sequence of distribution functions, not of scalar prices. What makes
a solution possible here are two radical simplifications. The first is of individuals' utility
functions. Utility is linear, which decouples marginal utility from the level of consumption.
It turns out that concave utility is a totally unnccesary facet of a business cycle model. The
second simplification is of the nature of the monetary shock. By limiting the shock to a
single occurence, and limiting the uncertainty about the shock to its time of occurrence, the
model's structural complexity can be reduced enough to analyze the response to the 1 shock,
with the bonus that comparative dynamics, using full-information benchmark equilibria,
are possible.
The framework I use is a linearized version of Lucas's (1978) model of an exchange
economy with a cash in advance constraint. There is a continuum of infinitely lived in-
dividuals and a continuum of markets. Each individual participates in a market in each
period, both as a producer and seller, and as a buyer. Within each market there is a con-
tinuum of individuals with demand shocks as in Lucas (197S). But in addition individuals
share a common taste shock within the market: this can be interpreted as the common
weather (relevant in. say. a market for taxicab rides), or a common fad. Each individual
lands randomly in a new market each period, and faces a new local market price. This
models the fact that individuals diversify in consumption, and do not sample all prices of
all goods simultaneously: rather, they sample one good and one price at a time.
In Lucas's (1972) model the supply and demand decisions were undertaken by different
individuals in each period and market: the old demanded goods, and the young supplied
them. In economies with infinitely-lived individuals, it is not as easy to separate the supply
and demand facets of individual behavior. The model here assumes individuals are both
suppliers and demanders in each period, and since they have both sides of the market, they
can more sharply distinguish nominal from real shocks. A central task of the model will
be to demonstrate whether the two-sidedness affects the extent and sign of the residual
effect of the unobserved shock. Because the cash-in-advance transactions construct induces
effectively separate timing of production and consumption decisions, the residual effect is
the same.
My modelling strategy is similar to that of Grossman and Weiss (1982). They use a
money in the utility function formulation: they impose an extraneous lag between labor
supply decisions and the output resulting from them. The lag adds an investment aspect
to labor. Thev also presume shocks to money demand that arc exogenous. These are
somewhat like the taste shocks I impose here, but it is a third shock, to money supply,
where the model here departs from the Grossman-Weiss model. Both models ultimately
depend on the same facet however: that there be too few prices in the model for individuals
to discern from those prices the relevant aggregate nominal quantity. They argue that when
information is costly, as in Grossman and Stiglitz (19X0). this paucity and noninvertibility
of prices will be the equilibrium. Hahm (1987) shows that this idea works in an extension
of Lucas's (1972) overlapping generations model.
The central finding of the imperfect information equilibrium is that a monetary shock
that is imperfectly detected raises output above' its full information level, affirming Lucas's
findings. The structure 1 of the economy makes it clearer that this is because 1 individuals
are using prices as a signal or means of communication. An information externality is
therefore associated with prices. The 1 conclusion analyzes this further.
In the following section the detailed structure 1 of the' evememiy is presented, and the
maximum problem fae-ing individuals is stated. Inelivielual poli<-y functions are- derived
in sectiem 3. In section 4 some assumptiems are 1 made 1 about the' equilibrium in order
to charae-teTize 1 the 1 value 1 function for the 1 individuals problem. In section 5 resource
cemstraints are 1 combined with these demand and supply conditions to write 1 down the 1
equilibrium conditions for each local marke-t. In section these 1 conditions are 1 united
te) yield an eepiilibrium for the 1 full-infe)rmation pe)St-shoe-k economy. The 1 properties e>f
the price function there are usee! te> anchor the- 1 analysis of the prie^ anel output effects
of the shock in the full-infe)rmatie>n ee-ememry in section 7. In section 8 the necessary
conditions for the imperfee't-inforniatiem equilibrium are set out. In section 9. the effect of
the assumptiems abemt the infbrmatiem structure 1 on the equilibrium art 1 detailed, and in
sevtiem 10 the 1 price anel output effects of the shock are 1 derived for the- imperfect information
equilibrium. Section 11 concludes by integrating the'finelings and speculating about welfare 1
anel policy implications.
2. THE ECONOMY'S STRUCTURE
The economy evolves e>ver elise-re^te time 1 . TluTe 1 is a continuum of marke-ts indexed by
market-specific taste shocks distributed over the real line. Within each market there is
a continuum of individuals in each period. Each individual can consume purchases made
with cash within the market, and each produces with labor in the same market. Within a
market, individuals share a common component of a shock to their taste for consumption
of that market's good in that period. They also have; individual-specific taste shocks, and
no individual can separately observe the individual and market-wide component of the
shock.
Within each market, individuals are indexed by their individual-specific shocks and by
the initial distribution of nominal money they hold. Individuals also produce output with
labor according to a production function with a marginal productivity of labor that varies
stochastically across individuals in a maimer similar to the taste shocks. Individuals who
produce output collect money income from its sale in markets distinct from the market
in which they buy goods. Because 1 of the 1 cash-in-advance constraint individuals face, this
money income cannot be --pent until the ensuing period.
In the next period, individuals are randomly assigned to new markets in their role as
consumers. The individuals within each market are thus spread out over all the markets
in the next period. The sampling of individuals is done in such a way that the initial
distribution of nominal balances across individuals within each market is identical across
markets. Viewed from the perspective of the local market. the> individuals in a market
have* a completely heterogeneous history of price observations from the past.
The individual's problem. Each individual solves a maximum problem that results
from the follejwing recursion in each period:
V(M.p.H.~.o.TM)= max.{0c-~f£ + PE[V(M , ,p\8','y',(j>'y.n')\n] (2.1)
c,£,M'
subject to the constraints
c + pM' <pM + (l- r)oi (2.2)
0<c<pM (2.3)
0<A/' (2.4)
< / < 7. (2.5)
The notation is as follows, c is re^al consumption of the 1 market good; fV is the taste shock; /
is labe>r supplied, with maximum possible labor /: - is the relative 1 distaste for labe>r: M is
nominal balances carried over from the previous period; M' is nominal balance's acquired
in the current period; o is the 1 current marginal productivity of labor for the' individual: r is
As in the Lucas (1972) model, lending markets are completely absent here. Having such markets
would have two effects. First, individuals with high productivity or low hunger would intertemporally
substitute their labor into the future via lending (and conversely, borrow under the opposite pattern of
shocks) I'll is would intensify Hud nations of outptil wit in it local markets. Second, -.nice the use of money
as a consumption-smoothing asset would diminish, price duct nations within markets would be affected.
Whether such fluctuations would be intensified or damped is not clear, nor are the informational effects
on aggregate fluctuations.
the tax or subsidy on output: p is the purchasing power of money in the market where the
individual buys and sells goods; (3 is the common discount factor: V is the value function:
il is the information set of the individual.
The constraints have the following interpretations. First. (2.2) states that expenditure
on consumption and new money balances must not exceed old balances and labor income.
Second. (2.;}) is the cash-in-advance constraint: consumption must be paid for in cash
carried over from the previous period. Third. (2.4) prevents using money as a borrowing
medium. This is the most severe restriction in the model, because in the presence of so
much heterogeneity, many lending opportunities exist that are not cleared by a market.
22 Fourth. (2.5) restricts labor to finite bounds.
Because the utility function is linear, the solution will consist of a list of corner solu-
tions characterized by inequalities. Individuals will work either not at all or the maximum
possible. 1. they will consume cither nothing or spend all their real balances, and they
will have four possible outcomes of next-period nominal balances: zero, no change, current
wages, or savings plus wages. The objective is simple, so the list of inequalities defin-
ing each case is short. Structuring the problem this way has two advantages: first, the
analytic form of the value function can be stated explicitly, and second, the corner con-
ditions partition the supports of the distributions of the stochastic shocks in a tractable
way. Instead of having complicated tastes and a simple economic structure as in static
general equilibrium theory, there are simple tastes and a complicated economic structure.
The 1 supply and demand functions that emerge from aggregating individual supply and
demand functions have the properties usually associated with them: demand functions are
smooth and downward sloping functions of prices.
The stochastic shocks are distributed as follows. First, the taste shocks have two
components:
H = ^A (2.6)
where 6 is the individual-specific component of the shock and A is the market -specific
component of the shock, with independent distributions
8~F{-), 0<fi<6<fi
A ~ $(•), (X A < 5c. (2.7)
Productivity shocks have no market-specific components, although in principle they could
be added. Thus within each market all producers have individual-specific productivity
shocks, but unlike the demand shocks, the distribution of these shocks is the same for all
markets. The productivity shocks are distributed as follows:
o>~ G(-). < o < o<u (2.8)
Nevertheless then' is good reason to believe that not much is being missed by this omission. Taub
(1988a, b) finds that b< >i li assets reflect the mechanics of an insurance contract in which there is privati
information, and t hat neither int rinsically dominates the other using a framework like the one here. But
Levine (I!)x(>) using a setting like thai of Scheinkman and Weiss (1983) finds the reverse
The A-shocks play a key role. Because they are market-wide (but not economy-wide)
they have the effect of shifting the market demand curve, much as a rainstorm shifts
the local demand function for taxicab rides to the right. If there are no market-wide
productivity shocks and no monetary shocks, as the market supply curve is traced out
the resulting price movements yield unambiguous information about the state of market
demand. But if there are unperceivcd monetary shocks this information is partly masked.
Information sets. The individuals in the benchmark economy have full information
about the economy's state. In the perfect information economy, individuals are unable
to observe any aggregate variables contemporaneously, and they do not know the market-
specific taste shock. A. They can. however, observe the market -specific price to infer the
market-specific shock and the aggregate state. This somewhat restrictive definition of
information is a sacrifice at the altar of tractability, but has the advantage of revealing
more clearly the role of prices in transmitting information. 2 "* 2i Thus the information
set. il. is defined .is follows:
ft' = (//:<>). (2.9)
Current information thus consists of previous observations and current observations of the
relative price of goods bought.
The money supply j)rocess. It is the usual practice in money growth models to use
seignorage to finance real lump sum distributions, or to distribute nominal money supply
increases directly to individuals via lump sum transfers. If monetary contractions are
the focus, neither of these strategies will work here because of the nonnegativitv constraints
on consumption, labor, and nominal money. With the economy comprised of stochastically
heterogeneous individuals, there will always be some individuals unable to provide their
requisite share of a lump-sum tax. Randomizing the tax across individuals would not help:
only individuals with positive realizations of income could then be taxed. Individuals with
zero income would avoid the tax. vitiating its lump sum character. Then; is instead a
simple proportional tax on output here. An increase 1 in the money stock will be used to
A more complete model would allow individuals to use other information that they implicitly use in
solving their maximum problems:
V.' = (0',p',(l ~t')0'-M).
Current information would thus consist of previous information and current observations of the individual's
taste shock which has information about the market's common taste shock, the relative pn<v of goods
bought, and a statistic with information about t he seignorage-financed subsidy.
If individuals were permitted to become informed at some finite cost, some would nevertheless choose
not to pay the cost but instead to use price information alone. Ilahm (1987) works out the mechanics of
this idea by combining the models of Lucas (1972) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
A more realistic model would have individuals producing in a market separate from the one where
t hey purchase consumption. This would increase their information they would observe two prices instead
of one. This would complicate the information sets, but the role of prices in transmitting information would
be unaffected.
See for example Brock (1975).
purchase real output in each market and this output will be distributed by a subsidy to
production, r, sufficient to use up the seignorage. Because individuals cannot observe the
subsidy directly, they will respond to positive- nominal shocks—which will raise apparent
relative productivity by lowering r— through their effect on apparent productivity as well
as through observations of relative prices in their shopping market.
In both the full information and imperfect information models, a money supply shock
occurs at a random time with an autonomous waiting time distribution it is a Poisson
process. The probability of the shock occurring in any period, if it has not already oc-
curred, is A. The increase m the money supply is fixed and known to all individuals in
advance in other words, the stochastic process governing the money supply is known, as
in Lucas (1972). Thus in the imperfect information equilibrium, individuals do not solve
an estimation problem, only a signal extraction problem.
Individuals do not observe 1 this one-time increase 1 in the money supply in the imperfect
information economy. Rather, they infer it from their observation of prices. If the shock
were never revealed directly, one would expect the economy to discover asymptotically
that the shock has occurred. Assuming that the monetary shock is fully revealed by an
announcement one period after it occurs eschews this difficulty. Before the shock, and
during the period of the shock, however, individuals are presumed unable to observe the
money supply. This requires them to filter the information available to them in these
periods, and preserves the imperfect information aspects of the 1 model. The period of the
shock will then be of central interest: in that period the money supply rises but individuals
cannot perceive this directly. They must extract a signal from prices.
Endogenous distributions. Then 1 will be equilibrium distribution functions of money
and information both within and across markets. Within markets, individuals will enter
the market with a distribution of nominal balances, ty . using Lucas's (1978) notation. At
the end of each period individuals will have traded goods and money, resulting in an end-
of-period distribution of money that is market-dependent. Each market is indexed by by
its local demand shock. A. and the local relative purchasing power, p. will be a function
of A since there are no other market-specific shocks. The end-of-period distribution of
nominal balances will be dependent on the local demand shock, or equivalcntly on the
local price 1 :
M' - TMA).
The next-period beginning of period nominal balances is thus
#(M') = J Tp/'jAWA.
Jo
Posterior distributions on the economy's state. The 1 economy's state 1 , n. is indexed
by the monetary sheu'k. There are> three possible 1 states, because the shock is announced
erne period after it occurs:
( -1 pro-shock
n — < shock in current period
I 1 > 1 periods since shock.
Since individuals will not be able to observe the state directly, and hence cannot distinguish
between states n = — 1 and n — 0, they will form a posterior distribution of the state
conditioned on their current information:
n ~#(-|12).
This posterior will be updated with new information. Finally, individuals will base 1 their
current behavior on their predictions of their own future states, including the economy's
aggregate state. The distribution of prices will depend on this state, and predictions of
prices will depend on thr prior distribution over these states.
3. SOLUTION OFTHE INDIVIDUAL'S PROBLEM
Since the contemporaneous return to consumption is potentially unbounded, the function-
analytic techniques used by Lucas (1978) cannot be translated intact to this setting, but
the simple structure of utility makes it possible to posit an explicit form for the value
function. Dynamic programming can be used to show existence and uniqueness even when
there is no explicit candidate for the value function. Here, there is an explicit candidate,
but more work must be done- to be assured it is the 1 value function. The techniques outlined
in Stokey and Lucas (1989, pp 243-247) can then be used to affirm that it is the value
function. The explicit form for this conjectured value function is affine in nominal balances:
V(ALB.p,(t)*.n) = An (ti.p.o\tt) + Au(ti.p.o\il)M. (3.1)
with the notation
6* = (l_ T )6.
Because of this form the 1 contraction mapping that naturally arises out of the solution is
an ordinary nonlinear difference equation.
The individual's maximum problem can be stated as a Lagrangian:
max {6c - -/ + (3(E(A ) + E{AM>)M')
c,£, M
'
+\ (<f)*i + pM - pM' - c) + \
x
(pM - c) + \>M' + A23e + A,/ + A5 (^ -£)}. (3.2)
The first order conditions are:
(c) 0-Xii -A, + A :1 =0
{£) -7 + Ack/>* + A4 -A5 =0
(M') JE(Am )-p\a + \-> = 0.
The corresponding policy functions arc given in the following table:
r £ Ml
*
(1) M » < VEA'JP 7PlflEA'm
(ii) 1 M + (f)*I/p < >
(ill) pM > <
(iv) pM I cj>*l/p > >
The states correspond to regions on the plane, illustrated in Figure 1. In state (i) individ-
uals are not hungry for consumption and not productive, so they consume nothing and do
not work. In state (ii) they are not hungry for consumption hut their labor is temporarily
productive, so they work, acquiring nominal income to be spent in the future. In state
(iii). they are hungry but not productive, so they do not work but they spend all the
money in their possession on consumption. Finally, in state (iv). they are both hungry
and productive.
The dividing line- between hunger and non-hunger, and that between productivity
and nonproductivity. is determined by the expected future value of an endogenous vari-
able. 3EA[
n
. the discounted expected future value of an endogenous variable. dEA'm , the
discounted expected marginal value of money. As the expected marginal value increases.
individuals tend to decrease their consumption and to increase their labor supply. They
decrease their consumption (more precisely, there are more individuals who consume noth-
ing) because they wish to acquire real balances to spend in the future, when purchasing
power is higher. They also work harder to increase their current cash income for the same
reason. Thus intertemporal substitution effects are captured by this single parameter.
The response of consumption to changes in purchasing power is the inverse of the
response of labor. This is a consequence of the cash in advance constraint. When current
purchasing power. /;. is high relative to its future value, it makes sense to spend money in
anticipation of its future decline in value. But current-period nominal income cannot be
spent until the following period, when purchasing power declines, because of the cash-in-
advance constraint.
4. FUNCTIONAL EQUATIONS FOR THE VALUE FUNCTION
Substituting the policy functions derived in the previous section into ( 1.1) yields a recursive
functional equation in the value function. Because of the nature of the utility function,
there are four separate equations:
(t) Al + AlnM= + 0(EA'o + EA'tn )
(ii) Ai + AlM= -yl + PiEA'v + EAlJM + tfl/p))
(Hi) Al + AlM = 0pM + pEA'Q
(iv)
.4,1 + A?nM = OpM - -J+.KEAl) + EA'm^l/p)
with the four states defined as in Table 3.1. Rather than solve this in matrix form, it
is convenient to collapse 1 these four equations into a single equation by integrating across
!)
hunger and productivity states as follows. Define
A = I I A ldF{6)dG(6) + J
I A2 dF(8)dG(<f>)
<> r h c<t> r^
+ / / AldF{6)dG{(j>) +11 AidF(S)dG(o) (4.2!
and
r>p rb i-o rd
Am = 11 A 1rndF(S)dG(<j>) +11 A^dF(S)dG(d>)
rO /•«*
where
/ f A lmdF{6)dG(o)+ j_ I A]ndF{b)dG(o) (4.:*)
and with o arising from the inequalities in Tabic .'M and from (2.10): o* — (1 — r)<b <
-p/'JEA'. or o < 7p/(l - r)0EA'.
Thus the focus will be on parameters that are averages of the four combinations of
individual-specific hunger and productivity shocks. Combining the equations in (4.1). write
the single equation.
Aq + AmM = 0EA'o + 3EA', n MF(hG(o) - yJF(6)(l - G(^)
+ J£-i;N .UF(^)(l - G(o)) + (JEi^FC^p-Hl - t)1 I odG(o)
Jo
+&pMG(o) I 6dF{6) + ApM{l-G(<i>)) I 6dF(fi)
Jb Js
--Ml - F{6))(1 - G{4>)) + .i£"A:,
?
(l - F(,M)y>-'(l - r)7 / odG(o).
Jo
Gathering common terms and equating the coefficients ofM and constant terms yields the
e( [nations
Aq = 3EA - -.7(1 - G(r,)) + .iEA'niP-Ul - TJt I odG(o) (4.5)
J
.4„, = 3EA'mF{8) + A;> / &iF(<*) (4.6)
10
The right hand side of (4.5) is a function of both .4,', and A'rn . but that the right hand side
of (4.6) is a function only of A'm . the future averaged marginal value of money. Thus (4.6)
ran be solved separately. In order to save notation, define A = .4,,,. and rewrite (4.6) as
A = pAF(6) (4.7)
with the shorthand definition
F(x) =xF{x)+ I 6dF{6).
The production side of the economy does not appear explicitly in this equation. This
separation of the demand and supply sides will facilitate the solution.
To solve equation (4.7) it is necessary to be explicit about the expectation operator
that is implicit on tin- right hand side of the equation. There arc thr< e separate equili ri
which the expectation must be calculated. The first is a stationary economy in winch there
are no aggregate fluctuations. The second is the full information economy in which there
are two sub-states: before and during the shock. The third is the incomplete information
equilibrium.
Stationary full-information economy. First, suppose there? is full information in an
economy that will never be shocked (or one which has already been shocked). We wish to
find a way to calculate E(A) to correspond to E(A') in (4.7). Examining (4.7). the current
period value of ,4 depends on the stochastic parameters A and p. Bur purchasing power.
/>. will be a function of A:
P = tt(A,1).
explicitly accounting for the fact that n = 1. Integrating (4.7) over the contemporaneous
shock A—that is. integrating over markets cross-sectionally —is equivalent to taking the
prior expectation of ,4 because of the stationarity of the economy. This yields a difference 1
equation in the average of .4. denoted by .4:
A= [ At(A.1)JT(
JE
^
),/<i>(A). (4.8)
.A, A?r(A. i)
This will be analyzed further in section 6.
Pre-shock full-information economy. Because there is full information, individuals
know whether the monetary shock has occurred in the current period or not. The expec-
tation is conditioned on this state. The conditional probability of the next-period state of
the economy, v(-\jj}). is straightforward:
v{n\- 1) -
and
v(n\m) —
1 -A. n = 1
A. n -=
ii r m - 1. in >
n = in + 1. in ^>
11
The expectation is therefore
E(Af \n = -1) =
^2 / ^'(nVSCA'Mn'l - 1
>>
-i
with £"(.4 ) identical to the stationary full-information economy case.
Asymmetric information, state-dependent economy. If there is individual-specific in-
formation, things are not so simple. The reason is that the expectation of the future value
of .4. .4 . is conditioned on current information. Finding the current value of ,4 means
integrating over the previous period's information. Thus
EA' = E(A\[}).
Now .4 is a function of the next-period information sot. {}' . which is in turn a function of
A', which is exogenous, and future price, which depends on both A' and on the state of
the economy. Thus if p = 7r(A. n), then
E{A\il)=^2 J2 A\n')d$(&')i/(n'\n)h{n\il). (V.))
n- -1 n -1 '
The calculation of the conditional probability distribution, H(-\U). is one of the central
difficulties of the model. This distribution expresses individuals' subjective evaluations of
the aggregate state of the economy, which they cannot observe direct lv. It is updated via
a Bayesian mechanism. Thus
,, iom
J(n f\n\n)h(n\il)
li{n\U ) —
Zm=-i J(W\il\m)h{m\n)
whereiy\12 denotes the increment to the information set, {//}. and J(-\n) denotes the
conditional likelihood of the increment to the information, fi'\0. This will be analyzed in
detail in section 9.
The next step is to analyze' the equilibrium properties of the stationary post-shock
economy and use those as a foundation on which to recursively analyze 1 the effects of the
shock on both the full-information and incomplete-information economies.
•
r
j. LOCAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND FUNCTIONS
Within each market there 1 is a continuum of demanders. each with the same market
taste shock. A. but independent individual-specific shocks. <\ and each with individual-
specific initial money balances, M . with distribution VP. The market demand function must
therefore aggregate over individual demands parametrized by these individual quantities.
In addition, the monetary authority adds to the market demand by spending seignorage.
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This seignorage is in turn acquired from taxing all markets at the same rate and then selling
the proceeds for money with the market regardless of the local shock. If a monetary shock
expands the money supply—which will be assumed through the rest of the analysis—then
the monetary authority uses the increase money to buy output and the real seignorage is
used for a subsidy of production. Thus real demand in market A is:
<&= / pMdV(M)dF(6)-T oldG(0). (5.1)
The interpretation of this equation is as follows. Within each market, endexed by its
demand shock. A. individuals who are hungry spend all their money balances on real con-
sumption. Since they face a cash-in-advance constraint, they cannot spend money they are
currently earning from labor on output, so this component of individual behavior can be
ignored. On the other hand, the monetary authority is adding money to the economy by
subsidizing production (r negative) or removing it by taxing production and burning the
money (r positive). If for example the money supply is increasing, the monetary authority
spends freshly printed money in market A. and uses the real quantities to subsidize pro-
duction in all markets evenly (i.e. at the same rate r). This translates into an increased
demand for goods in market A. The demand function is now simpler:
q£ =;;(A)(1 - F(S)) I Md*(M) - rl f odG(o). (5.2)
./() Jo
where the limits of integration have the obvious definitions from (5.1).
Supply of goods in market A. The supply of goods in market A is straightforward.
It is
ql= J _ oJ(l-r)dG(o) (5.3)
Jyp( A i/( l-r)fjEA'
In an economy with complete information. EA will be independent of A.
Distribution function of money. The end-of-period distribution of nominal balances.
T(-|A). is determined by the four separate combinations of taste and productivity shocks.
Thus,
T(M'|A) =F(S)G{4>)V(M') (0
+ F(r) I ^(M ! -(l-r)oJ:/p)dG(o) (ii)
Jo
+ (l- F(r))G(o) {Hi)
+ (1 - F(S))(G(M'p/(l - t)1) - G(o)). (*',.)
(•
r
>.4)
where the numeration corresponds to Table 3.1. The cases are as follows. In case (i), indi-
viduals are neither hungry nor productive, so they simply keep their beginning-of-period
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balances and do not acquire more cash from the sale of output. In case (ii). individuals
arc not hungry, and so keep their beginning of period balances, and also acquire additional
balances from the sale of output. Thus the integration is over holdings of real balances
from the sale of output. Thus the integration is over holdings of real balances such that
the sum of these two docs not exceed M' : M < M' — (1 — r)(j)*£/p. In case (hi), indi-
viduals are hungry but not productive. They take in no new balances and spend all that
they have. All individuals in this state 1 will revert to zero real balances. Finally, in cast 1
(iv). individuals are hungry and productive. Therefore they spend all beginning of period
balances, and acquire cash from the sale of output. This yields the pair of inequalities
M' > (f>*l/Pi and <•/> > o.
Simplifying the above expression slightly yields
T(il/'|A) = F(S)G(6)W{M') + F(fi) I ®(M' - (1 - r)6f./p)dG\ o
+(l - F{6))G(M'p/(l - r)f,). (5.5)
The beginning-of-pcriod distribution of money holdings is derived by sampling from the
end-of-period distributions evenly across markets:
tf(Af') = / ra/'jA)r/<I>(A)
Jo
= / {F(6)G(j>)y{M') + F{fi) I 9(M*-(l-r)(f>£/p)dG{0)
Jn Jo
+ (1 - F(6))G(M'p/(l- r)7)}r/<I>(A). (5.6)
This equation corresponds to the recursive equation for the distribution $ in Lucas (1978)
and Taub (1988). The mixing of individuals across markets is accomplished here. It
permits the analysis to "start fresh"' each period in each market. Subsequently it is not
necessary to be concerned with the structure of XV . and it is possible to write
17= / MdW(M).
o
In an equilibrium, the supply and demand functions must be equal within each A-
market. Equating (5.2) and (5.3) yields
p{A)(l-F(8)) MdV(M)= / o7,/l7(oV/<I>(A). (5.7)
Jn JO J~,i>/(\-t).SEA
This is a functional equation in />. holding £".4 fixed. Taking EA as given, it is possible to
solve for p: see Figure 2. Because p is purchasing power, the demand and supply functions
have the opposite of their conventional slopes.
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Money-market equilibrium. Equilibrium in the money market is achieved when end-
of-period nominal balances equal the existing stock of money in the hands of individuals
plus the 1 new stock that is used for the subsidy within each market:
.'*
M = M- Ti
/ MdG((f>). (5.8)
•/-,/,/( Y-T)fJEA'
The equation of exchange. The right hand term of (5.7). when integrated over all the
A-markets, is the aggregate output of the economy. The term 1 — F. which is the fraction
of individuals who are hungry in the market, is the local velocity Thus the equation of
exchange for this economy is
/ M(A)(1-F(A'))^(A) = / />(A)
_l
/ f.6dG(6)d&{&). (5.9)
./()
Both output and prices are averaged on the right hand side of this equation. Dividing out
aggregate output yields the price level:
P= I p(Ar l I l(f>dG(<b)d$(A)/ I MdG(d)d$(A).
JO ./,., ./() Ju
This is different from tin- average5 price of output across markets. Economy-wide velocity
is also an average:
V= I M(A)(1 - F(rt))rf$(A)/ / M(A)d$(A)
fi. EQUILIBRIUM IN THE STATIONARY FULL-INFORMATION ECONOMY.
The next step is to prove the existence of and characterize the equilibrium in the sta-
tionary full-information— that is. post-shock economy. The equilibrium can be found by
considering just two equations in the marginal utility of money. 4. and the purchasing
power of money function. tt{-, 1):
A= /^A-(A.1)F( - jf'
4
),M>(A) (4.8)
and
P(A)(l-F(c)) Md*(M)= / Md.G(<p). (5.7)
Reasonable properties from .4 follow from ( 4.8) holding -(•. 1) fixed, and conversely prop-
erties for 7r(-. 1) follow from (5.7) holding .4 fixed. This generates insight for solving Loth
equations simultaneously.
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A simplification that sidesteps main- complications is the assumption that there 1 is no
money growth after the shock, ami hence r — in the stationary full-information economy.
The goods market equilibrium equation then becomes
K{AA)(l-F{j3EA'/An(£A)))M = / / (fidG(cp). (6.1)
'<)
'-vTTi A.l |/( l-T);1L\\'
The expected marginal utility of money. Consider equation (4.8) first. First of all a
unique stationary marginal utility of money exists, holding constant the price function.
PROPOSITION" 6*1. Holding 7r(A, 1) fixed, there exists a unique solution to (4.8).
PROOF: The proofs of all propositions are in the Appendix.
Solution of the price function. Now analyze equation (6.1). Holding constant EA
yields an equation in -(•. 1). and the existence of 7r(-. 1) as a function of A is immediate
via standard supply-demand arguments. Formally.
PROPOSITION 6.2. In the stationary full-information equilibrium, with F and G
continuous and differentiate, holding constant EA. and equilibrium price function rr(A. 1)
exists such that: (i) 7r(A. 1) is continuous; (ii) 7r > 0; (Hi) a is differentiate and decreasing
in A; (iv) the elasticity of price is
(Itt/tt MttoF'(S)
>!
" tlA/A " M7r[fiF'{S) + 1 - F{6)] + l<j>2G'(i)
with
|//| < 1:
and (v) 77 is differentiate and increasing with respect to EA .
The fractional price elasticity accords with intuition: some of this increase 1 in demand
in a market should result in increased output, and some should raise the price of output.
The next step is to integrate 1 the properties of EA' and ~(A. 1) to show the existence 1
of an equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 6.3. There exist EA' and tt(A. 1) such that (6.1) and (6.2) are
satisfied, and therefore an equilibrium exists.
Market-specific demand shocks. Suppose there 1 is a market-wide demand shock, A.
The effect can be rvpresenteel intuitively as seen in Figure lb. The increased demand
raises the 1 prie-e 1 (and equivalently lowers the 1 purchasing power e>f money), and this lowers
the threshold of supply. Me^re 1 individuals have e/>-shocks that exceed the threshold and
supply rises. The rise of A. by reducing the 1 consumption threshold, increases demand for
output. Because of the fractional prie-e elasticity in equation (6.2). this effect dominates
the- opposing effect of the increase of price.
7. EQUILIBRIUM WITH A MONEY SHOCK UNDER FULL INFORMATION.
Now consider the economy that receives a one-time increase 1 in the" quantity of money,
of known magnitude but at a random time. When the shock occurs, it is fully anel con-
temporaneously observed by all individuals in the economy. There will be three states,
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n. of the economy: pre-shock (n = —1). during-shock (n — 0). and post-shock (n — 1).
In each state, there will be three equilibrium conditions: the marginal utility of money
condition, the market-clearing condition, and the money-growth finance constraint. Be-
cause the states are sequential, the early states will depend on the later states, but not
vice versa. The analysis will therefore work backwards from the later states.
(i) Marginal utility of money. The marginal utility of money equations have the form
of (4.8). The post-shock equilibrium is identical to that analyzed in section (i. The other
equations are as follows.
(n = 0): A(0)= I A7r(A.0).F(<$)d$(A) (7.1)
./o
£ = ;':£[( 1)/A?r(A, 0): (7.2)
(n = -l): A(-l) = At(A.-1)/"(cW/<I>(A> (7.3)
h)
c = 0((1 - A)A(-l) + A1(0))/Att(A, -1): (7.4)
The n = equation reflects the fact that the next period's state is known to be state n = 1.
and hence £"(.4. ) = -4(1). even though the current state is // = 0. The last equation reflects
the fact that in the pre-shock state the next-period state may again bo the pre-shock state.
n = —1. with probability 1 - A. or the shock may arrive with arrival probability A. with
state n = 0. If the price functions -(A. 1). 7r(A,0), and 7t(A. -1) are known, then these
three equations will yield solutions for .4(1). .4(0). and A(— 1) by solving the equations
sequentially in the order 1. 0. -1. and successively substituting the results into the next
equation.
(ii) Market clearing. Once again, there are three equations, one for each state of the
economy. The during- and pre-shock market-clearing equations are as follows:
{n = 0) : tt(A.0)(1 - F{fi))M(0) = I \ odG{o). (7..r,)
co
— 7r(A.())/(l-r(())) ; a(l): (7.0)
(/> = -!): tt(A. -1)(1-F(A))A7(-1)=7 / OilG(o). (7.7)
o = 77t(A, -1)/(1 - r(())),i((l - A)A(-l) + \A{0)): : (7.8)
with fi defined as in the marginal utility of money equations in each state.
(iii) Money-growth finance condition. Because the money supply change only at the
time of the shock, the following conditions hold:
(n = -l): M(-l)given: (7.!))
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(n = 0): M(Q) = M{-1)-Tt I o,/(7M,/#(A): (7.10)
J0 -l-i-ni A.0)/( l-T(0))/i.\( 1)
(n=l): M(1) = M(0). (7.11)
Purchasing power and output effects of the money shock. In period zero, under full
information, individuals anticipate transiting into the stationary state, n = 1, in the
following period. Therefore as of period zero. EA = .4(1). a constant independent of
period-zero events, and it is possible to calculate the effect of the shock on purchasing
power using the equilibrium condition (5.1) alone. It is not necessarv to incorporate the
money-market equilibrium condition. (7.10). because at time zero, the money supply has
already grown.
Proposition 7.1. A full-information equilibrium exists.
PROPOSITION 7.2. (i) The during-shock purchasing power is lower than the post-
shock purchasing power, (ii) The during-shock output is higher than the post-shock output.
Thus the effect of an increase in the money supply will be to increase output in the
period of the monetary shock relative to its future' value. This increased output has two
causes. The first is the direct effect on output from the 1 seignorage-financed subsidy, which
increases output. The second effect is an intertemporal substitution effect: the decline in
purchasing power anticipated as of period zero discourages production in period zero. The
direct subsidy effect overwhelms the intertemporal substitution effect in the derivative
-
.
,
o (p <Ik
' l-T 7r(A.0)</T
The first term, the direct effect of the subsidy, is positive. The second term is the price
effect and is negative but smaller in magnitude than the subsidy effect.
Marginal utility of money effect. Since the price function is affected by the nione
shock, so will the marginal utility of money in state zero. This has no direct effect on tin
state-zero equilibrium but does affect the pre-shoek state. From equation (7.3).
v
dA{0) d_
(It dr
A7r(A,0)JF(£)d$(A;
./()
A{^^) + 7r(A,0)^)— ^}d$(A;
(It t (It
(It r
"
JO lr h
A— / SdF(6)d<f>(A) < 0. (7.12;
If there; is a shock that increases the quantity of money,
A(0) >A(l).
is
that is. the marginal utility of money is higher in the period of the shock than in the
post-shock equilibrium because of the anticipated decline in purchasing power. This effect
will later be central to demonstrating the output effects of the shock under imperfect
information.
Pre-shock price and output effects. The anticipation of the shock will affect the pro-
shock economy. The effects arc harder to calculate because the marginal utility of money
equation and the equilibrium equation must be brought into play simultaneously.
PROPOSITION 7.3. Relative to post-shock levels, the anticipation ofa positive mone-
tary shock (i) reduces pre-shock purchasing power and (ii) reduces pre-shock economy-wide
output.
Thus a positive monetary shock induces not only a short run increase in output in
the period ofthe shock, but the long run post shock output level will be higher than the
pre-shock output. It would be incorrect, however, to conclude that the post-shock output
is unusually high: in fact is the the pre-shock output that is unnaturally low. Individuals
know that the purchasing power of money has a positive chance of falling, and therefore the
pre-shock marginal value of money is lower than the post -shock value. Fearing the decline
in value of their nominal wages, individuals work less hard in the pre-shock state than in
the post-shock state as a result, but attempt to spend down their current money balances
and increase consumption in anticipation of the decline in purchasing power. The effect is
illustrated in Figure lc. Relative to the post-shock equilibrium, the low expected marginal
utility of money and the relatively high purchasing power in the pre-shock equilibrium
lowers the ratio 6A/p.
The permanent rise in output observed with the money shock would not be evidence
of true output-stimulating effects of monetary shocks. It would be just as correct to say
that the anticipation of money shocks reduces output. In observing such a full-information
economy in the aggregate without identifying restrictions about individual markets and
preferences, there would be the paradox that easily measured short run increases in the
money supply increase output, but difficult-to-moasuro declines in long run output result
from such an environment.
8. IMPERFECT INFORMATION WITH REVELATION AFTER ONE PERIOD.
Now consider the equilibrium in which the money shock is identical to that in the full
information economy, but individuals observe only the price in their market. All individual*
are fully informed one period after the 1 shock, in state n = 1. but before the shock (n = — 1)
and during the shock (// = 0) individuals are uninformed about whether they are in state
— 1 or state 0. The uninformed alter the subjective probability of the state from their
observations of local purchasing power. Because the information is imperfect, the posterior
probability of the state is a weighted average of the two possible states.
As in the full information economy, there are three sets of equations that characterize
the- equilibrium: the marginal utility of money conditions, the market clearing conditions.
and the money growth finance conditions. In addition, the posterior probability of each
state must be analyzed. The post-shock equations are identical to those of section (>. The
s
1!)
pre- and during-shock equations are as follows (the subscript U denotes "uninformed"):
(i) Marginal utility of money. The marginal utility of money for individuals in the
pre- and during-shock states is
ALr(-l)= I A7rr (A. -l)^(^(-l))rM'(A). (8.1)
Au(0)= I A7rr/ (A,0).F(<5(0))d$(A), (8.2)
Jo
with
rH-l) = ^U'|7rr(A.-l)/A7r u (A.-l). (8.3)
6(0) = ^E(A'\7:n (AA))/AT: n (AA)). (8.4)
and with the definitions
EUVriA.-l)) = /K-l|7rLr(A.-l))((l-A)l(-l) + AA(0)) + /KO|7r(/(A.-i))A(l) (x.5)
E(AVtf(A.O)) =M-lki/(A,0))((l-A)A(-l) + AA(0)) + /i(0|7rt/(A,0))A(l) (8.6)
where />(/? |~) is the posterior probability of state n conditional on purchasing power. Ob-
serve that the form of the expected marginal value of money is identical in both states:
any difference will arise only from the different level of purchasing power influencing the
subjective probability of the current state.
(ii) Market-clearing. The uninformed market-clearing conditions are as follows:
(n = -1) : 7rfr(A, -1)(1 - F(H-l)))JI(-l) = 7 I odG(o). (8.7)
JSt -1 I©i — i j
(r?. = 0): 7ri/(A.())(l-F(£(0)))Af(0)=* / 'WG(o). (S.S)
where <$(— 1) and <^(0) are defined as before and
M(-l)=-
;
7rr (A.-l)/.i£-(A'|7:r-(A.-l). (8.9)
0(0) =77r[/(A,0)/(l - r(0))J£"U'|7rr<(A.()). (8.10)
(iii) Mojaey-growtli finance condition. Because the money supply changes only at the
time of the shock, the following conditions hold:
(n = -l): M(-l)given; (8.11)
_ _ _ r*
M(i)) = M(-l)-r(())f. 6dG(o) (8.12)
Jor(O)
17(1) =17(0) (8.13)
In order to analyze the equilibrium further, it is necessary to spell out the updating mech-
anism in more detail.
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!). THE POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTION OF THE AGGREGATE STATE.
Before and during the shock, individuals will attempt to infer the state of the economy
from their observations of the price 1 of output, p. For prior probabilities of the state 1
h(n\il-\). the updating formula for the prior is
n{n\u) — n{n\p: U;
Em=-1 Pr(PWM'»l«-l)
Because the v shock is a one-time shock and there is revelation after the shock, an individual
knows that he is not in the 1 post-shock state if it has not occurred. Thus the priors are' the
raw likelihoods 1 — A and A of the two states n = —1 and n — 0, and the- updating formula
has the' time-independent form
. ,, ,
Pn/,1- nil -A)
h{-l\p) =
Pv(p\ - l)(l-A)+Pr(;>|0)A
and
, , , »
Pr(w|())A
l(()\p) = : — :
. 9.111
Pr(p\ - l)(l-A) + Pr(p|0)A
Consider the 1 probability that the price is in a small interval. {p*p+ f). This is just
the probability that A is in ( A, (0). A-j( 0) ) if n = 0. and the probability that A is in
A] ( — 1). A 2 ( — 1)) if n — —1. weighted by the probabilities of those two state's. These latter
probabilities are
/A.,!-l)
Pr{A:Ae(A,(-l).A2 (-l))} = / ,/*(A).
•/A,! -I)
Pr{A: AG (A,(()).A,(()))} = / rf$(A).
These probabilities can be 1 approximated:
Pr{A: Ae (A,(-1).A,,(-1))} ^<I> / (A
1
(-1))(A,(-1)-A
1 (-D).
Pr{A : A 6 (A,(()).A,(0))} =* <I>'( A, (()))( A-_,(0) - A, (0) I.
An approximation for the difference of the 1 prices is:
f = (A, (0)-A,(()))7t'(A
l
(()).()) = ( A, (-i)_A-j(-l))-'( A, (-l).-l). (0.2)
Using Bayes's rule.
Pr{(p.p + e)\n = -l)Pr(n = -1)
Pi(n =-l\(p.p+f)) =
Pr((p.p+e-)\n =
-l)Pr(w = -1) + Pr((p.p + e)|n = 0)Pr(w - 0]
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=
^
/(A,(-1))(A,(-1)-A
1
(-1))(1-A)
" $ /(A 1 (-l))(A2(-l)-A 1 (-l))(l-A) + $'A l (0))(A 2(0)-A l (0))A'
Substituting for the ratio (A2 (0) - Ai(0))/(A2 (-1) - A,(-l)) from (9.2) and letting t
grow small yields the posterior probability
(l-A)$ /(A,(-l))/7r/(A l (-l) ; -l)h(n=
-!!;>) =
l-A)<I> /(A
)
(-l))/7r'(A
1
(-l).-l) + A<i>'(A 1 (0))/7r / (A, (()).())
and similarly for Pr(p = 0|p).
The definition of the posterior h(-\p) uses derivatives of purchasing power but depends
on values of A corresponding to observed price. To use the posterior in the definition of
expected marginal utility of money (8.3) and (8.4), define the inverse function of purchasing
power:
Dip. n) = A such tli.U m A. n 1 = /;.
Then write
where
h(n= -l|7r(A,m)) = — '
N(-1) + N(0)
N(-l) = (1- \)<l>' ( D(77( ^. n> ).-{))/ z' ( D(tt( A. ni ).-l). -1):
iV(0) = W(D(-(A. m)A)))/ir'{D{ir{A, m),0),0),
and similarly for h(0\p).
It is possible to calculate the derivative of the price 1 function in terms of itself and A.
The starting point is the elasticity analysis of the price function in (6.2). which says
,'(A) =
-^; .
and no derivatives appear in the formulation of tt' . and the posterior is thus defined in
levels of purchasing power:
/M-l|-(A.m))
n-A)'l''(/J(7T(A.m).-l ))/)(7T( A.m).-1 )
_
;r( A. m) ;/(-!) ,„ „*
(
\-\)'\>'( [)(*( A,m).-1 ))D(n{ A.m).-I )
_
X'V [ />("tt( A.m ) .0 ) ) D{ tt( A.mi.O) ' \ ' J
tt( A.mjr/( -1
J
7r('A,m)r?(0j
It is apparent that the posterior is a continuous function of 7r(A, m ) and of EA . This fact
is used in the proof of existence in the next section.
10. PRICE AND OUTPUT EFFECTS UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION.
The effect of the anticipated but unobserved money shock will now be calculated. In-
dividuals qcquire imperfect information about two things simultaneously: the economy's
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aggregate state and local demand, by observing a single statistic, price. Because price does
double statistical duty, it performs both less than perfectly.
PROPOSITION 10.1. IfQ'.F, F'. andG' are continuous, there exist unique equilib-
rium A(-l) mid A(0).
Proposition 10.2.
7T/(A,0) < -, iA.O) < TTy (A, -1) < 7T/(A.-1).
COROLLARY 10. .'5. (i) The during-shock output is higher under imperfect informa-
tion than under full information, (ii) Pre-shock outpout is lower under imperfect informa-
tion than under full information.
Thus, because it is mistaken for a market-specific demand shock, the monetary shock
has the same output-increasing effect, but the effect is economy-wide. This is just the same
mechanism proposed by Phelps 1969). and found by Lucas (1972). This is not the \vh
story, though. In the full information case there are other effects < r work. First, before
the shock, the "natural rate" of output is lower than in the post-shock state because in
the pre-shock state individuals recognize the positive probability that the value of their
earnings will be diluted by a money shock. Second, contemporaneous with the shock,
output is lower than it would be under a pure subsidy because of the anticipated decline
in purchasing power in the subsequent period.
The results can be appreciated by examining Figure 5. The squeezing together of the
price functions under imperfect information is a form of price stickiness. The stickiness
by reducing price differences, reduces the very information value of the prices. It retards
recognition of the shock in the following sense:
. .
.
imagine that some event occurs which would, if correctly perceived by all. in-
duce an increase in prices generally. Sooner or later, then, this adjustment will
occur. Initially, however, more traders than not perceive a relative price move-
ment, possibly permanent, in their favor. As a result, employment and investment
both increase'. Through time, as price information diffuses throught the economy.
these traders will see they have been mistaken. In the meantime, however, the
added capacity [and output] retards price increases generally, postponing recog-
nition of the initial shock. [Lucas. 1977: bracketed term added.]
Because the uninformed will respond with more output than if they were informed due
to price stickiness, output will respond more elastically, and therefore rise higher, than it
would in the full information equilibrium. This means that for a given rise in the quantity
of money, the subsidy rate is higher, even of the informed, and this raises output still more.
Thus the intertemporal substitution effect is present here, and even interacts synergist ically
with the imperfect information effects. But even in the absence of the intertemporal
substitution effect -even if money were superneutral the imperfect information effect
would persist. Output responds more to a monetary shock under imperfect information
than under full information.
The intuition of price stickiness might be connected to the intuition of asymmetric
information. In asymmetric information models such as insurance models, a central orga-
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uization attempts to eleicit information from heterogeneous individuals about their state.
The necessity of eliciting information makes the task, such as insurance provision, imper-
fect. Here, the information transmission process is reversed; individuals wish to infer the
aggregate state by observing a local statistic, price. But again, because price must do two
things at once—clear markets and provide information—it cannot do both perfectly.
11. CONCLUSION.
There have been many simplifications here. I "cooked" the model to obtain the intuitively
reasonable results. The main discovery is that when individuals use price information for
consumption and production decisions, a positive monetary shock can induce them to in-
crease outpout beyond their response were they fully informed. The differential response
of consumption and production arises from the effective lag between production and con-
sumption induced by the cash-in-advance constraint. The response arose 1 in the model
simultaneously with a Tobin-Mundell effect that is. with the economy responding posi-
tively to inflation even when fully informed, due to intertemporal substitution of labor and
consumption. Viewed only in the aggregate, it would be impossible to distinguish these
effects.
The Sargent and Wallace (1973) observation that anticipation of the shock has effects
before the shock has been affirmed. Judging from results of Friedman (1969) and others
about the optimum deflation, the increased output from the Tobin-Mundell effect will not
be welcome, because it induces a pre-shock output decline. The rise m output noted during
and after the shock is thus entirely misleading; it should be interpreted as a reversion to a
beneficial condition from a deleterious one in which inflation was anticipated.
The deepest result here is the additional output response generated under imperfect
information, when prices convey information. Because individuals become partly informed
by observing prices, they garner an external benefit from the market activities of oth-
ers, a benefit in the form of useful information. Incorporating this benefit would surely
complicate 1 the assesment of welfare.
Why is this information externality expressed through nominal prices? It must be
that the alternative of a non-monetary system is worse in some way. Suppose the attempt
were made to internalize the externality via policy. In the simple framework used here.
an extreme increase in the money supply will result in all prices rising so much that all
individuals in all markets become close to perfectly informed but with the deleterious
side effect of decreased pre-shock output. Surely there 1 is nothing here to suggest that
expansionist monetary policy is called for: the classical solution of an externality is either
a stronger definition of property rights or a tax or a subsidy. It is hard to imagine how
property rights to prices could be helpful to an economy, and it is not clear what should
be subsidized. The only clear policy implication seems to be to avoid the fluctuations that
mask the information in prices in the 1 first place 1 . In other words: Let the money supply
grow at k percent per year immutably.
April 1988
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12. APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Define the function f(S) = A,t(A. 1). Then write the
equation as
A= I f(A)f([3A/f(A))d$(A). (A.l)
>0
-I
(Observe that .4 = EA because the As are not serially correlated.) Now A is a number.
not a function. Assume that /(A) is a positive bounded continuous function. Intuitively,
7t(A. 1) should be a decreasing function of A (remember A is a demand shock and p is
purchasing power). Thus the derivative of / is at this point ambiguous.
The following useful properties of/" are straightforward to demonstrate:
in F'{.v) = Fir):
(ii) .F(O) = I SdF(S):
(iii) T{x) = .r. .r > 6.
Figure 3 plots f\6)T{i3[A/ (<*>)) as a function of A. holding A rixed. If/ is not too small
then tins graph will cross the 4 r> degree line at a unique point.
Next, define / as
J=l /(AW$(A) < dc.
Then
(/(A)//)rf*(A)
is a probability measure. Thus the equation for .4 becomes
A = J [ (f(£)/f)F(0A/(6))d*{£). (-4.2!
That is. the right hand side of (A. 2) is a convex combination of the graphs generated by
the fT terms. Since all these graphs share the same properties, the convex combination
will share 1 these properties. (See Figure 4.) But therefore there is a fixed point, x.
Proof of Proposition 6.2. First, observe that k is clearly noimegative:
—
-7 / odG{o) > 0.
—'£)
./-,7r, A. 1 mhea'M{ 1 - F J ynfXl )/PEA
Next observe that tt ^ 0. Suppose the contrary. The equilibrium condition would thou be
= J.
a contradiction. Similarly, as 77 approaches (pf3EA /~
:
. the equilibrium conditioncannot be
satisfied.
To show continuity, just note that because F is continuous by assumption, so is zr.
This shows (i) and (ii).
To show (hi), use the implicit function theorem to calculate the derivative, using the
differentiability of F and G. After some algebra, this yields
(Ik tt
^ = -r,<0. (A3)
when 1 ;/ is the elasticity defined in (6.2). This monotonicity implies that 7r(A, 1) is mea-
surable, and therefore the product /(A) = Att(A,1) is measurable (Taylor. 1966. pp.
103-105).
Property (v) follows directly from differentiating the equilibrium condition:
d- MwfiF'(6) + li2G'(i)
(.4.4)
d{EA ) Mtt[SF'(6) + 1 - F(c)] + h!)2 G'(o)
completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition (>.3. From (6.2). calculate
-^r-(AII(A. 1)) = 7T + Arr'( A) = tt(1 4- //) > 0. (A5)
From Proposition 6.2 (v), an increase in £"-4 increases rr(A. 1). and from (A.5) this in-
creases /, which increases the right hand side of (A.l). The mapping in (A.l) can be
written A — T[A}. and clearly T maps from the real line into itself. The real line is a
Banach space under the absolute value norm. In order to show that T is a contraction,
then by the theorem of Blackwell (1965). the following properties suffice.
(i) Monotonicity. A > D implies T[A] > T[D]. Since T is a function, it suffices to
show that T has a positive 1 derivative 1 . Recalling that T' = F.
~ I /(A)^(,i4//(A))eM>(A)
"'4
./„
= [™{f(A)F(0A/f(A)) + F({1A/f(A))(l - (Af'(A)/f(A))[3}d$(A)
Jo
where the prime denotes differentiation with respect to -4. Using the definition of F. this
yields
/ {f'(A)[6F{6) + I fidF-6F(6)] + 0F(i3A/f{A))}d${A)
./() Jb
= / {/'(A) / SdF + 3F(PA/f(A))}d${A)
Jo Jb
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From (A.-r>). /' (A) > 0. and therefore V is positive.
(ii) Discounting: The mapping has the discounting property if for a constant. C. there
exists a bound, A. such that T[A + C] < T[A] + 8C. Thus.
/ f{A)F{[3(A + C)/f{A))d$(A)
Jo
< I™ f(A){F(i3A/f(A)) + [snpF']pC/f(A)}}d<!>(A)
Jo
when 1 the supremuni is taken over the domain of T. the real line. But T' — F < 1, so
f(A){F({iA/f(A)) + f3C/f(A)}d<!>(A)
1 / f(A){f(PA/f(A))}d$(A) + fiG
Jo
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7.1: The existence of the during-shock equilibrium is immediate
since £"(.4 \n — 0) = .4(1) whose- existence was proved in Proposition fi..'i. However m the
pre-shock state. E(A.'\n = -1) = (1 - A)A(-l) + AA(0). Thus Z(0) is fixed, but A(-l) is
endogenous. Multiplying both >ides by ( 1 - A) and then adding A.4(0) to both sides yields
T[(l-X)A(-l) + XA(0)}
= (1 - A) / /(A)JP"(/i((l - X)A(-l) + A~4(0))f/$(A) + A.4(0).
with /(A) = A7r(A. -1). Since the addition of a constant to the transformation does not
alter the monotonicity and discounting properties, the convex combination ( 1 — A).4( — 1) -f-
A.4(0)) exists and hence so does .4(1). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7.2: It is most convenient to get at the effect l>v varying the
tax rate. r. When this tax increases, the money supply decreases in period zero. The
effects of money growth, then, will have the opposite sign of the effect of taxes. Implicitly
differentiating (7.5).
d-K{A, 0)/dr =
77(A.O) WG'U
1 - t Mtt^F 1 ^) + 1 - F(r)} + io 2 G'{o)
This derivative is calculated holding the post-shock, rather than the pre-shock money sup-
ply fixed. Therefore; the effect on purchasing power is relative to the- post-shock stationary
economy. Observing the change in purchasing power forward through time. then, an in-
crease in the tax rate increases purchasing power over time: this corresponds to a decline
in the quantity of money. Conversely, an increase in the quantity of money will produce a
decline in purchasing power between state zero and state one.
The output effect is also straightforward to calculate. Aggregate output is the weighted
average of each market's output:
y= I J I <pdG(cl>)d${A).
./() Jo
Thus
We have
(It
r7oG'(o)'^<mA).
Jo <lr
dxj) f/(77T(A,0)/(l-T)/M(l)) (} (!) r/77
It (It \-t tt(A,0) (It
i f
x _
7^G'(o) \
l-r\ iU^F'(^)+ 1 - F(e)] - fo-G'i »)
Thus the output effect is
£ = - ri±-G'w_ K*vr® + i-F®]
'It
./<> 1-r A/7r[<5F'(e) + 1 - F(/»)] + /o-G'(^)
~>c
~ 2
/ 1——G'(i)i)d$(A) < 0.
/,, 1-r
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7.3: First observe that
r/M(-l) > 0.
that is. holding the post-shock money supply constant, an increase in the tax rate increases
the pre-shock money supply.
Next, calculate the marginal utility of money:
dA(-l) /"",,'/- /'" Ir, N m/?u/1 „ <£*(-!) v^(0
r/r
/' (A^ /" 6dF{6) + 0F(*)[(1 - A)^> + A^2>]}d*(A).
Gathering terms,
(LM-l)
,It
.C A^^li ,/>/F(,),M>( A) + ;JA^ ,C F(Wa( A)
1-/?(1-A)/°°F(W(A)
Noting that EA = (1 — A)A(— 1) + A.4(0). it will be useful to calculate the derivative of
this quantity:
(IEA'
, N
(lA(-l) (lA(i))
= (1- A)—
;
+ A
(It (It (It
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r {(1_A){A^^/ MF(*) + /JiW(l-A)^}
./o
«6
+A{A '/:7(A ' ())
j
MF(tf) .}d$(A).
(IT
./<•>
The next step is to calculate" the derivative of purchasing power. Implicitly differen-
tiating the equilibrium condition.
<frr(A,-l) 7r(A,-l)(l-F(£))^ii
dr M(-1)[6F'{6) + 1 - F(<5)] + f.<f>2G'{<i>)/i:
kM{ -l)fiF'(6) + Id2 G' ( d
)
t: r^l'
mJ7(-1)/F'i>) + 1 - Fu\)] + U>-G*'M F/.T dr
(AX)
This equation, combined with (A. 7). yields solutions for the derivatives of the marginal
utility of money and purchasing power with respect to the tax. Writing (A. 8) in compact
notation.
(k(A,-l) 77 dEA
— Hi) + hi]
(It eA < It
where kq and k\ are positive. Substitute this into (A. 7) to solve for dEA /dr:
dEA
(It
/tt(A.O) i'S
f~ {(l-X)AJ r^ Jl_ MF^) + XA^^Jl Q) MF(S)}cmA).
A.')]
1 - (1 - A) J
~ {0F{6) + ^K 1
-^Ji(_ l) 6dF(6)}d^(A)
Since d~(AA))/dr < 0, this expression is negative if the following inequality holds:
(1- A) / [pFfy + Am-^ I 6dF(6)}d$(A) < 1. (.4.10)
•A) EA Js(-i)
The left hand side can be written
0(1 -A) / {F(^) + ~ I 8dF(6)}d$(A).
'0 is 'S(-l)
Since h \ is a positive fraction.
< 0(1 - A) / (F(e) +
* / MF(^)}#(A)
• In b J6{ -I it>(
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/•OJ A I'd
= /?(l-A) / —^WF(<s) + / &JF(tf)}d$(A)
•A) 3EA Jb(-\)
,
A(-i)
= (l-X)-A^=r< 1.
Therefore <1{EA )/dr < (). and cZtt(A, — l)rfr < 0. That is. the effect of a rise in the money
supply will be to raise the price level over its pre-shock level, in accord with intuition.
Tht- output effect can now be calculated. The response of the labor supply threshold
is
dd> 7 ( I (In 1 (IEA' \
=
(It \ k (It £\|' (It
-K() h',\ — 1
EA'
Since K\ is a fraction, and <IEA jdr is negative, this expression is positive. Therefore
dy(-l) f
00
--
.
- deb
, 4C6G'(d)^-d$(A) <().
(It Jn (It
This completes the proof.
Tlie> following lemma is needed in the proof of Proposition 10.1.
LEMMA . For a fixed posterior distribution, h(— 1), there exist unique A(— 1) mid
A(0) under imperfect information.
Proof: Define
W-[.-»ifm-w"*'.f"wi
+>f„w,,"-^;f"' ,M„.
Each of the summands has the monotonicity and discounting properties demonstrated in
the proof of Proposition 6.3. Thus the convex combination. T. has these properties. Thus
if -4 > B. then T[A] > T[B]
,
and T[A+ C] < r[A] + /3(maxA h{-l))C < T[A] + 0C. Thus
T is a contraction mapping, and a unique -4 exists. Then
and
.4,0,= / /uni/,./"-";;; 11 -4^^)
30
This completes the proof.
ProofofProposition 10.1: First use the convex combination A = (1— X)A(— 1)+\A(0).
The posterior is determined by a mapping v : R —* H. with elements h E H. the space
of posterior probability functions. Inspection of the formula for h( — 1 1 7r) shows v to be
continuous under the assumption that $'(•)) F(-), F'(-). and G'(-) are continuous.
Given a posterior. h{ — 1 1 7r) . there is a unique .4 by the lemma above. Thus there is a
mapping u : 7{ — 7-i\ with h E 7i. This mapping is clearly continuous if H is normed by
the sup norm.
The composite mapping uv : R — R is thus continuous. It remains only to show that
\.lv maps into a compact set. Clearly uu{A) > 0. Claim : If .4 < .4(1). then liv{A) < .4(1).
Thus uv maps the convex set [0. .4(1)] into itself. By Brower's fixed point theorem [Hutson
and Pyin. p. 2().r). Th. S. 1.1] there exists a fixed point. .
Proof of Proposition 10.2: (ii) Examining (*.7) and (K.S). the equations arc identical
for the same tt. except for the tax term and the higher money supply in the // = equation.
Having shown in the full information case that the decreased purchasing power caused by
the rise of the money supply outweighs the increase in purchasing power brought about by
the production subsidy, (ii) follows.
-/,
(i) Observe that E(A \k) is a convex combination of marginal values of money in the
post shock state, and the marginal utility of money in states zero and — 1. But in the
during-shock state, the subsidy increases the marginal utility of money, and in the pre-
shock state, the lower quantity of money raises the purchasing power of money. Thus.
[{1 - \)A{-1) + \A{0)] > A(lj. and therefore
E(A('\tt) = fc(-l|7r)[[(l - A)I(-l) + \A(())} + k(Q\ic)A(l) > A(l).
Therefore (i) holds. A similar argument establishes (iii).
:U
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